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STRUCTURIZATION AND MODELLING OF TECHNICAL DEVICES OF
HAZARDOUS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
A.A. Kadirov, A.A. Kadirova, R.G. Abdeev
Abstract. Every year, the problem of industrial safety is becoming increasingly relevant. The
effective industrial safety management system (ISMS) organization becomes especially important
for nuclear energy, chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas, mining, metallurgical industries, coal
mines and other industries, including enterprises with hazardous production facilities (HPF).
Any violation of operating modes, unaccounted technological and operational defects can lead
to serious consequences and accidents, accompanied by significant material costs and
technological disasters. An important place among the problems of industrial safety is the
problem of trouble-free operation of technical devices (units, machines and mechanisms,
technical systems and complexes, technological equipment, instruments and apparatus) of
hazardous production facilities. However, existing approaches to solving this problem have
limited application. The article proposes an effective solving method of the problem based on the
use of graph models. The advantage of such modelling is the simplicity, clarity and ease of
mathematical algorithmization of the studied production processes and technical systems.
Keywords: industrial safety, hazardous production facility, automated control system, graphs,
modelling.
The tasks of an automated industrial safety management system are the reducing industrial safety
risks, labour intensity, reducing the time for processing information, accounting for hazardous
production facilities and technical devices, automating maintenance processes and repairs of
technical equipment and devices at hazardous production facilities.
We note the fact that the automation of solving industrial safety problems is mainly due to the
automation of documentation support. Extremely little attention has been paid to the creation of
automated control systems for maintenance and repair of equipment of hazardous production
facilities (ACS MRE HPF). Although these issues are relevant to enterprises in many industries,
the formalized mathematical description problems of the complex technological equipment
structures, the implementation of computer models and computer monitoring of the HPF
equipment state are not completely resolved [1-19].
The HPF technological equipment structuring
Recreating of the equipment structure, sets of interconnected nodes and details with associated
information about the service life (nominal resources), as well as algorithms for taking into
account the dynamics of downtime, operating hours, residual resources, is a necessary basis for
solving the problem of the equipment state predicting, optimizing planning, and management
repairs based on developed information and software. We used the following basic principles to
the equipment structuring [20, 21]:
1. Equipment for mathematical modelling purposes is considered from a set-theoretic
position.
2. Equipment is presented in the form of a multi-level hierarchical structure.
3. The equipment structuring is carried out to the level of further indivisible elements.
4. Each element (node) of the equipment is assigned an unambiguous correspondence with
its identification number.
5. In addition to the identification number, each element (node) of the equipment has its
own distinctive features, quantitative or weight characteristics, and a nominal resource.
6. An oriented graph is adopted as adequate to the concept of «structure» and the settheoretic form of equipment representation.

7. The technological network structure is defined as the union of many graphs of
technological equipment units.
Based on the principles formulated, we will show the main stages of computer modelling of the
hazardous production facilities equipment for the gas pumping aggregate GPA-1 of
Shurtanneftegaz JSC, shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1. Equipment for the gas pumping aggregate
The equipment structure
To represent the structure of equipment in computer memory, we use sets and graphs.
We introduce the notation. In this case, capital letters of the Latin alphabet will denote sets and
lowercase - elements of sets.
A – 1st level «Workshop»;
B – 2nd level «Equipment»;
C – 3rd level «Equipment (auxiliary)»;
D – 4th level «Nodes»;

E – 5th level «Nodes»;
F – 6th level «Details»;
H – 7th level of «Fuel and Lubricants» (conditional level).
Given these designations, we describe the composition of the power turbine DR-61 № GT-102.
A= {аi}, where i=1
а1 – workshop GPA-1;
В=(b1, b2, b3, …, b11);
where the elements of the set B are the following units of basic equipment:
b1 – single-case two-stage compressor Datim 12 № C-101
b2 – power turbine DR-61 № G-102
b3 – gas generator LM-2500 № GG-103
etc.
C =C1 C2 C3 ,…, Ck ,
i
where C is the set of auxiliary units included in the i-th main equipment.
So, in the considered fragment
C2={c21}
this is c21 auxiliary equipment included in the power turbine DR-61 No. GT-102:
c21 – a pump of cooling oil of power turbine P-145.
Many nodes, included in the units of the main equipment
D =D1 D2 D3 ,…, Dk ,
where Di is the set of nodes of the bi -th basic equipment.
So, D2 is a set of equipment nodes b2, that is, a power turbine DR-61№ G-102:
D2={d21, d22, d23, …, d211},
where
d21 – carter;
d22 – turbine block casing;
d23 – rotor;
d24 – the bearing block cover;
d25 – block radial and thrust bearings; d26 – internal thrust bearing;
d27 – external thrust bearing;
d28 – front pillow block bearing;
d29 – rear pillow block bearing;
d210 – stator housing;
d211 – exhaust box.
Е is the second-level nodes set:
Е=Е1 Е 2 Е 3 ,…, Е k ,
i
where Е is the set of nodes of the second level, included in the i-th node of the first level.
So, the set
Е3={е13, е23, е33, е43}
is the set of nodes included in the rotor, that is, in the 3rd node of the first level. The elements of
the set are as follows:
е13 – drive clutch;
е23 – second stage disk;
е33 – auxiliary drive gear;
е43 – first stage disc.
F is the set of details included in the nodes:
F =F1 F 2 F 3 ,…, Fi ,
i
where F is the set of details of the ith node.
For example, F3={f13, f23 } is the set of the drive clutch details: f13 – bolt; f23 – screw.
The equipment model is formed using the menu item «Structural Modeling - Loading Models».
When selected, the window shown in Figure 2 will open.

Fig. 2
To view and edit the model, you must select the equipment in the «Select model» list. For
example, consider a power turbine. After selecting «DR-61 No. 102 Power Turbine» in the list
and clicking on the «View» button, a list of the main components will open (Figure 3).
Since the equipment may include different levels of nodes and details, these levels can be viewed
by selecting a different layer and clicking the «View» button. The table contains the following
data:
• Name of the element;
• Date and time of replacement;
• Hours and minutes (nominal resource);
• Included in element No. (element number in which the current element is included).
We can edit the data and click the «Save» button.
To view the residual resource of nodes and details, we must select the menu item «Structural
Modelling − Model Builder». This opens a window, shown in Figure 4. In this window, we can
select the type of equipment «Power Turbine», and in the next window – «Power Turbine DR-61
No. 102».
As a result, the structure of the main components of the power mill and their residual resources
will be displayed (Figure 5).
The used resource is shown in black and percent, and the remaining resource in white. This
figure shows that the «Carter» node has almost exhausted its resource and is in a pre-emergency
situation.

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5
Figure 6 shows the composition of the «Carter» node and its residual resources.

Fig. 6
Conclusions
Thus, the article formulates the principles and method of structuring the technical devices of
hazardous production facilities and modelling the equipment, based on the set-theoretic approach
and graphs.

References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Causes of a man-made disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric station.
http://www.contrtv.ru/print/3303/
The disaster on the Moscow metro (2014). https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katastrofa_v_
Moskovskom_ metropolitene
Railway
disaster
near
Ufa.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeleznodorojnaya
_katastrofa_pod_Ufoy
Major
accidents
at
hazardous
production
facilities
in
2013.
http://www.mspbsng.org/upload/iblock/Krupnyie avarii za 2013.pdf
Karabanov Yu.F. New approaches to the implementation of the industrial safety regulation
elements: industrial control and industrial safety management systems // All-Russian
Scientific and Practical Conference "Industrial Safety-2014". 17 p.
Kutyin N.G. On the concept of state policy perfection in the sphere of dangerous industrial
objects’ industrial safety // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2012, № 11, P.
89-98.
Burkov V.N., Grischenko A.F., Kulik O.S. Tasks of the optimal industrial safety
management. Moscow: Institute of Control Problemsnamed after V.A. Trapeznikov RAS,
2000. -70 p.
Rasmussen B, , & Whetton, C. (1993). Hazard identification based on plant functional
modelling. Roskilde: Risø National Laboratory. - Denmark. Forskningscenter Risoe. RisoeR, No. 712(EN)
Georgiadou P., Papazoglou I., Kiranoudis C., Markatos N., (2010) Multi-objective
evolutionary emergency response optimization for major accidents. // J Hazard Mater. 2010
Jun 15;178(1-3):792-803. doi: 10.1016/j.jhazmat,2010.02.010.
Pantyuhova Yu.V., Methodology for assessing the level of industrial safety of hazardous
production facilities of gas distribution and gas consumption systems. Dis…. candidate of
technical sciences: 05.26.03. 2011.- 127 p.
Standart OAO «Gazprom». Hazard identification and risk management. - Moscow:
«Gazprom», 2014.- 23 p.
Swuste P., Theunissen J., Schmitz P., Reniers G., Blokland P., (2016) Process safety
indicators, a review of literature. // J Loss Prev Process Ind 40: 162–173.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2015.12.020/.
Ziyatdinov R., (2015) The choice of equipment for automation of hazardous production
facilities. // IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering, Volume 86,
conference 1.
Abdrakhmanov N.Kh., Abdrakhmanova K.N., Vorohobko V.V., Abdrakhmanov, A.R.
Basyrova R.N. ,. (2015). Modeling of scenarios of development of emergencies for nonstationary hazardous production facilities of an oil and gas complex. Oil and Gas Business.
516-531. 10.17122/ogbus-2015-5-516-531.
Lee K.H., Kwon H.M., Cho S.S, Kim J.Y., Moon I., (2016) Improvements of safety
management system in Korean chemical industry after a large chemical accident. // J. Loss
Prev. Process Ind. 2016; 42: 6–13. doi: 10.1016/j.jlp.2015.08.006.
Besserman J., Mentzer R.A., (2017) Review of global process safety regulations: United
States, European Union, United Kingdom, China, India. // J. Loss Prev. Process Ind, 2017;
50: 165–183. doi: 10.1016/j.jlp.2017.09.010.
Schipitsin R.V. Improving the industrial safety management system of enterprises operating
facilities of the main pipeline transport. S. Petersburg: Peter the Great St. Petersburg
Polytechnic University. Higher School of Technosphere Security, 2018.-78 p.
Bochkov A., (2019) The Integral Method of Hazard and Risk Assessment for the Production
Facilities Operations. In: Advances in Reliability Analysis and its Applications. Springer,
2019. P. 149-199.

19. Mahutov N.A., Gadenin M.M., Pechёrkin A.S., Krasnyih B.A. Scientific problems of
service life determination and management of industrial objects safe operation life //
«Occupational Safety in Industry», 2019; № 4; P. 7–15. doi: 10.24000/0409-2961-2019-4-715.
20. Kadirov A.A. Automatization of control processes for maintenance and repair of
equipment.- Tashkent: Fan va texnologiya, 2017.- 256 p.

